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FOURTH AMENDMENT-PROTECTIVE
SWEEP DOCTRINE: WHEN DOES THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT ALLOW
POLICE OFFICERS TO SEARCH
THE HOME INCIDENT TO A
LAWFUL ARREST?
Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Maryland v. Buie,' the Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment permits an officer executing an arrest warrant in a pri-
vate awelling to search rooms other than the room in which the
arrest is made, whenever the searching officer possesses a reason-
able belief, based on specific and articulable facts, that the adjacent
rooms harbor another individual posing a danger to those on the
arrest scene. The majority based its approval of this "protective
sweep" on the "reasonable suspicion" exception to traditional
fourth amendment searches first articulated in Terry v. State of Ohio.2
The majority thus extended the Terry holding, which permits officers
to conduct a protective, warrantless search of a person, to "protec-
tive sweeps" conducted by police officers incident to a lawful, in-
home arrest.3
Conversely, the Buie dissent argued that the Terry test does not
extend to searches of the home and that the fourth amendment war-
rant and probable cause requirements should be applied to protec-
tive sweeps in private dwellings. 4 The dissent warned that the
majority understated the intrusiveness of the search, and reasoned
that the majority's holding further would erode traditional fourth
amendment protection from warrantless searches of the home.5
This Note examines the evolution of the protective sweep doc-
trine and the prior Supreme Court cases which have defined the
I 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990).
2 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3 Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1098.
4 Id. at 1103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 1102 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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right of law enforcement officers to conduct a warrantless search
under either exigent circumstances or incident to an arrest. This
Note argues that the Buie majority correctly balanced the legitimate
concerns of officer safety against the sanctity of the home embodied
in the fourth amendment. The Court thus reasonably extended the
Terry doctrine to warrantless searches of the home while preserving
fourth amendment safeguards against unreasonable search and
seizures. This Note argues, however, that while the emphasis on
officer safety is appropriate, the majority failed to offer adequate
guidance as to the types of "specific and articulable" facts which
may outweigh the established fourth amendment protections of the
home. When assessing the constitutionality of a protective sweep,
this Note suggests that certain factors should be given priority in
balancing the concerns of officer safety against the protections of
the fourth amendment.
II. HISTORY OF THE PROTECTIVE SWEEP DOCTRINE6
Generally, a "protective sweep" is a "quick and limited search
of a premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the
safety of police officers or others."' 7 The protective sweep is an ex-
ception to the fourth amendment mandate that a law enforcement
officer have probable cause and a search warrant to conduct a search
of an individual's home.8 Courts have developed the "protective
sweep" doctrine to allow officers lawfully executing an arrest war-
rant to take action to protect themselves when they reasonably fear
that confederates of the arrestee might endanger their safety.9 This
doctrine emerged in response to the uncertainty regarding the right
of law enforcement officers to conduct a search incident to an in-
home arrest.
Prior to Chimel v. California,10 an officer generally was allowed to
6 See generally Joseph, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Protecting Arresting Officersfrom Attack
by Persons Other than the Arrestee, 33 CATH. U.L. REv. 95 (1983) [hereinafter Joseph];
Kelder & Statman, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Recurrent Questions Regarding the Propriety of
Searches Conducted Contemporaneously with an Arrest on or Near Private Premises, 30 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 973 (1979) [hereinafter Kelder]; W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.4 (2d ed.
1987) [hereinafter W. LAFAvE].
7 Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1094.
8 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
9 State v. Toliver, 5 Wash. App. 321, 324, 487 P.2d 264, 267 (1971).
10 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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search throughout the place where an arrest was made to find and
seize items connected with the crime. 11 This right to conduct a war-
rantless search incident to a lawful arrest extended to searches far
beyond the room in which the arrest was made. 12 Officers generally
were allowed to search the entire area considered to be in the "pos-
session" or under the "control" of the person arrested.13
In Chimel, officers went to the arrestee's premises and waited
with his wife for the arrestee to return.' 4 Upon the arrival of the
arrestee, the officers executed the arrest and then searched the en-
tire three bedroom house for evidence. The officers searched the
attic, garage and even opened drawers to look for evidence.' 5 The
California court upheld the search of the petitioner's entire house
under the "possession" and "control" theory. 16
The Chimel Court examined the confused state of the law re-
garding the right to conduct a warrantless search of the home, and
held that an officer executing an arrest warrant may search the ar-
restee's person and any "nearby area" from which he or she might
obtain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 17 The
Court stated, however, that a "comparable justification" did not ex-
ist to allow the officers to search any room other than the one in
which the arrest occurred.' 8 The Court concluded that the fourth
amendment mandates that searches of other rooms or through
closed and concealed areas can only be conducted under the author-
ity of a search warrant.19
The Chimel Court thus separated the protection rationale, which
warranted the search of the arrestee and the area under his or her
immediate control, from the desire to obtain evidence, which did
not warrant such an intrusive search of the rest of the home. The
Court in Chimel acknowledged that this approach was similar to the
analysis underlying their previous decision in Terry v. Ohio.20
In Terry, decided one year before Chimel, the Court replaced the
11 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 (1950).
12 See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (search of entire four room
apartment of a man arrested in his living room approved as "incident to arrest").
13 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760.
14 Id. at 753.
'5 Id. at 754.
16 Id. at 760.
17 Id. at 763.
18 Id.
19 Id. It is important to remember that the search in Chimel beyond the immediate
reach of the arrestee was primarily a search for evidence, not a protective search for
potentially dangerous third persons. See infra text accompanying notes 84-87 for a dis-
cussion of this important distinction.
20 Id. at 762.
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requirement of probable cause for searches and seizures in certain
arrest situations with a reasonableness test.21 The Tery Court ex-
amined the legality of a street-side, stop-and-frisk search by an of-
ficer who, though he had no probable cause to make an arrest,
nonetheless suspected that the individual under surveillance was
armed and dangerous.22 The Court held that if a police officer rea-
sonably concludes from the facts present that the person with whom
he or she is dealing is dangerous, then the officer can conduct a
carefully limited search of the person to look for weapons that may
be used against the officer.23
The Terry Court limited the scope of this exception to the
fourth amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements by
declaring a two-pronged reasonableness test; specifically, the of-
ficer's intrusion must be: (1) justified at its inception; and (2) rea-
sonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
initial action.24
Applying this dual inquiry, the Terry Court first held that an of-
ficer must be able to point to "specific and articulable facts" which,
together with the rational inferences from those facts would justify
the officer's intrusion.25 The Court reasoned that the fourth
amendment requires that these facts be judged against an objective
standard that asks whether the facts available to-the officer at the
moment of the search would "warrant a man of reasonable caution"
to believe that the action taken was appropriate. 26 These specific
facts require more than the arresting officer's "good faith,"'27
"hunches," or unparticularized suspicion.28
The Teny Court then analyzed the scope of the officer's actions
to determine if the search was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances at hand. The Court acknowledged that even such a
21 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
22 Id. at 6-7. The officer in Teny had examined two men loitering in front of a store,
and suspected them of planning a robbery. When the officer identified himself as a
police officer and asked the men for their names, they "mumbled something" in re-
sponse. Id. at 7. At this point the officer grabbed Terry and patted down the outside of
his clothing and felt a pistol. Id. He ordered the men inside the store where he removed
a revolver from Terry's pocket. Id. The officer testified that he patted the men down
only to see if they had weapons, and he did not put his hands beneath the outer gar-
ments of Terry until he felt the gun. Id.
23 Id. at 30.
24 Id. at 20.
25 Id. at 21.
26 Id. at 22.
27 ld.
28 id at 27.
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brief search was intrusive,29 but it also stressed that in certain situa-
tions, an officer's concern for his or her safety must outweigh the
intrusiveness of the search.30 The officer's search in Terry properly
was confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to dis-
cover weapons or instruments which could have been used to attack
the officer. 8 ' The Court emphasized that the search was prompted
only by the officer's concern for his safety and stressed the limited
nature of the holding 3 2
The Court subsequently has extended the Teny rationale to
other factual settings.33 For example, in Michigan v. Long,3 4 the
Court applied the Terry rationale in holding that a police officer may
search for hidden weapons in the passenger compartment of an au-
tomobile if the officer reasonably believes based on "specific and
articulable facts," that the suspect is dangerous and may gain imme-
diate control of weapons.35 The Long Court recognized that the ac-
tions of the officer at issue were prompted by safety concerns, and
expressly rejected the contention that the holding of Terry was lim-
ited to searches of detained suspects.36
In recent years, many federal and state courts confronting the
legality of protective sweeps3 7 have required that arresting officers
have the articulable suspicion required in Terry that third parties are
on the premises.3 8 However, the courts have disagreed over what
29 The Court held that "[elven a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons
constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it
must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience." Id. at 24-
25.
30 Id. at 27.
31 Id. at 29.
32 The Court held in part:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he
is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weap-
ons which might be used to assault him.
Id. at 30.
33 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug
testing of railroad employees); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)
(routine vehicle stop at border checkpoint).
34 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
35 Id. at 1049.
36 Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1095 (1990).
37 For an extensive listing of both federal and state cases addressing "protective
sweeps," see Kelder, supra note 6, at 974-76; see also Brief for Petitioner at 9-11 nn. 2 & 3,
Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (No. 88-1369) (1990).
38 United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 1988).
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standard to apply when determining whether a protective sweep is
reasonable under the fourth amendment. Some courts have held
that police must have probable cause to believe that third parties are
present before they can legally search the entire house.3 9 Other
courts have attempted to consider the total circumstances of the en-
counter and balance the exigency of the arrest situation against the
nature of the intrusion.40 Thus, courts have demonstrated confu-
sion regarding the applicability of Terry and the scope of Chimel
when dcfining the protective sweep doctrine.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 3, 1986, the Prince George's County police de-
partment obtained arrest warrants for Jerome Edward Buie and
Lloyd Allen in connection with an armed robbery of a restaurant
earlier that day.41 The police placed Buie's home under surveil-
lance.42 On February 5, 1986, a police department secretary tele-
phoned Buie's home and spoke to a female and to Buie. Six or
seven officers then proceeded to Buie's home to execute the arrest
warrant.43
Upon their arrival, five officers entered Buie's residence and be-
gan to search for him.44 Corporal James Rozar announced that he
would guard the basement so that no one could come up and sur-
prise the officers.45 Rozar drew his service revolver and twice
shouted downstairs, ordering anyone in the basement to come up. 6
A voice finally asked who was calling, and Rozar announced three
times: "This is the police, show me your hands. '47 A pair of hands
emerged from around the stairwell, and Buie ascended from the
basement.48 Rozar then proceeded to arrest, search, and handcuff
Buie.49
Shortly thereafter, Detective James Frolich entered the base-
39 See, e.g., United States v. Gerry, 845 F.2d 34, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v.
Kolodziej, 706 F.2d 590, 597 (5th Cir. 1983); Buie v. State, 314 Md. 151, 550 A.2d 79
(1988).
40 United States v. Baker, 577 F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850
(1978).











ment "in case there was someone around." 50 Once downstairs, he
noticed a red running suit lying in plain view on a stack of clothing;
he proceeded to seize it.51 This suit matched the description given
by a witness of the suit worn by one of the robbers.5 2 After seizing
the suit, Detective Frolich proceeded upstairs.5 3
At trial, Buie argued that the officer had no right to enter the
basement; therefore, the unconstitutionally seized running suit
should be suppressed as evidence. The trial judge ruled against
Buie's argument, holding that Frolich's search of the basement was
reasonable to insure the officers' safety.54 The running suit was ad-
mitted into evidence, and Buie subsequently was convicted in the
circuit court for robbery with a deadly weapon and the use of a
handgun in the commission of a felony.5 5 Buie appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the trial judge erred in ad-
mitting the suit into evidence.5 6 The Court of Special Appeals af-
firmed the trial court's decision, stating that if the police are lawfully
in the home and the arrestee has accomplices who are still at large,
reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, is sufficient tojus-
50 Buie v. Maryland, 72 Md. App. 562, 566, 531 A.2d 1290, 1292 (1987). It is un-
clear from the record exactly why Officer Frolich descended into the basement. This
should be significant on remand. The transcript of the defense counsel's cross-examina-
tion of Officer Frolich during the suppression hearing contains the following with re-
spect to Officer Frolich's entry into the basement:
Q. And you observed the officer handcuff [Buie]?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then place him under arrest?
A. Yes, sir.Q. What did the officer do with [Buie] at that point?
A. I don't know.
Q. Took him out, whatever. At this point, you decided to go into the basement?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you know what you were looking for?
A. I just went down there in case there was someone around.
4 Did you have any reason to believe that anyone else was in the house besides
Mr. Buie?
A. I had no idea who lived there.
Id. at 566-67, 531 A.2d at 1292.
51 Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1095.
52 Buie, 72 Md. App. at 565, 531 A.2d at 1292.
53 Id.
54 The trial court judge denied the motion to suppress and held in part:
[t]hey had a right to search and they had a right to seize based on the facts of this
case. The man comes out from a basement, the police don't know how many people
are down there. He is charged with a serious offense.
I think the police acted reasonably in this case and if they had gone back to get
a [search] warrant, that [the running suit] wouldn't have been there.
Buie v. State, 314 Md. 151, 155, 550 A.2d 79, 81 (1988).
55 Buie, 72 Md. App. at 565, 531 A.2d at 1291.
56 Id.
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tify a limited, additional intrusion to investigate the possibility of
their presence. 57
The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed
the lower court.58 The Court of Appeals stressed the special sanc-
tity of the home under the fourth amendment and stated that to
justify a protective sweep of the home, the government must show
that there is probable cause to believe that "serious and demonstra-
ble potentiality of danger" exists.59 Accordingly, the court held that
in light of the police officer's acknowledged lack of probable cause,
the search of Buie's basement violated the fourth amendment, and
the running suit should not have been admitted into evidence. 60
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to-determine when po-
lice officers may conduct a warrantless search of the home under the
guise of a "protective sweep." 6 1
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, Justice White began by stating that the
fourth amendment clearly entitled the officers to enter Buie's home
and, once lawfully in the basement, to seize the running suit in plain
view.62 The majority reasoned that the issue in this case was the
level of justification the fourth amendment required to permit
Detective Frolich to enter the basement to see if someone was
there.63
The majority acknowledged that the fourth amendment barred
only unreasonable searches and seizures. 64 Justice White recog-
nized that to determine reasonableness, the Court must balance the
intrusion of the search on the individual's fourth amendment inter-
ests against the intrusion's promotion of legitimate government in-
terests.65 The Court acknowledged that although a search of a
house generally is not reasonable without a warrant issued on prob-
able cause, there are contexts where the public interest is such that
neither a warrant nor probable cause is required. 66
57 Id. at 576, 531 A.2d at 1297.
58 Buie v. State, 314 Md. 151, 550 A.2d 79 (1988).
59 Id. at 159-60, 550 A.2d at 83.
60 Id.
61 Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1096 (1990).
62 Id. at 1096.
63 Id
64Id
65 Id (citing United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983); Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
66 Id at 1097.
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The Court then focused on Terry v. Ohio 67 and its holding that a
street "frisk" for weapons is governed by a reasonableness test, and
therefore is not subject to the warrant procedure. 68 The Court
noted that the holding of Terry was not limited to its factual situation
and already had been extended in Michigan v. Long69 to permit
searches of the passenger compartment of an automobile. 70
The majority then reasoned that the "ingredients to apply the
balance struck in Terry and Long were present in this case."'7 1 Ac-
cording to the majority, the salient ingredient in the Terry doctrine
was an officer's concern for his or her own safety or the safety of
others.72 The majority asserted that the Court in Terry and Long was
concerned with the immediate interest of police officers in taking
steps to assure themselves that the persons under investigation were
not armed or capable of immediate control of a weapon that could
unexpectedly be used against them.73 Likewise, the officers in Buie
had an interest in taking steps to assure themselves that the house in
which the suspect had just been arrested was not harboring other
dangerous persons who could unexpectedly launch an attack.74 The
Court concluded that the risk of danger associated with an in-home
arrest was "as great as, if not greater than, the danger of an on-the-
street or roadside investigatory encounter. ' 75 The Court stressed
that, unlike an encounter on the street or along a highway, an in-
home arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his ad-
versary's "turf," and thus concluded that an ambush in an unknown
and confined setting is to be feared more than one in open and
more familiar surroundings. 76
The majority then held that the interest of arresting officers in
taking reasonable steps to ensure their safety was sufficient to out-
weigh the intrusion involved. 77 The Court, consistent with its hold-
ing in Chimel v. California,78 stated further that an officer may, as a
precautionary measure and without probable cause or reasonable
67 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also supra text accompanying notes 21-35.
68 Id. at 20-21.
69 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). See also supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
70 Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1097.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1097-99.
73 Id. at 1097.




78 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Court in Chimel held that an officer could search the
arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control," limited to the "area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Id. at 763.
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suspicion, look in closets and spaces immediately adjoining the
place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately
launched. 79 The Court declared, however, that beyond this limited
search, the officer must be able to provide "articulable facts which,
taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would
warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be
swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene."80 The Court did not give any examples of what facts or
types of facts an officer should consider when making an assessment
of the existence of potential danger from third persons.
The Court limited this search to only a cursory inspection of
those spaces where a person may be found.81 The Court explained
that because a protective sweep was not motivated by a search for
evidence, it had to be limited to what was necessary to protect the
safety of the officer and others.8 2 Furthermore, the Court held that
a sweep could last no longer than necessary to erase the reasonable
suspicion of danger-at a maximum, it could last no longer than it
would take to complete the arrest and leave the premises.8 3
The majority proceeded to distinguish Buie from Chimel.8 4 The
majority reasoned that while Chimel was concerned with a full-blown
search of the entire house for evidence of the robbery, the intrusion
in Buie was more limited.85 Justice White made the important dis-
tinction that while the justification for the search of the arrestee in
Chimel was the threat of danger posed by the arrestee, the danger in
Buie was the threat posed by unseen persons in the house.86 The
Court then reiterated that the search invalidated in Chimel was a full
scale search for evidence, while a protective sweep is justified only
when an officer acts to protect his or her safety.8 7
Finally, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals had ap-
plied an unnecessarily strict fourth amendment standard by requir-
ing that the protective sweep be justified by probable cause.88 The
Court remanded the case to the Maryland Court of Appeals to de-
termine whether Detective Frolich possessed a reasonable belief
based on specific and articulable facts that Buie's basement har-
79 Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1098.
80 Id.










bored an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.8 9
B. CONCURRING OPINIONS
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens emphasized that the major-
ity holding applies only to protective sweeps. 90 Justice Stevens
stressed that such a search is permissible only when the officers' ac-
tions are justified by their concern for their safety.9 1 Stevens rea-
soned that, on remand, the state would have to demonstrate the
following: first, that the officers had a reasonable basis for believing
that someone in the basement might attack them or interfere with
the arrest; and second, that it would have been safer for Detective
Frolich to go down the stairs instead of simply guarding them from
above while Buie was removed from the house.92 Stevens noted
that the facts of the case suggested that no reasonable suspicion of
danger justified the entry into the basement and that the State may
face a formidable task on remand. 93
Justice Kennedy added a one paragraph concurrence in which
he expressed his disagreement with Justice Stevens' belief that the
officer's search of the basement was unjustified by the circumstances
of the arrest.94 Justice Kennedy instead argued that the officers'
conduct was in full accord with standard police safety procedure and
was a necessary precaution. 95 Justice Kennedy added that his com-
ment was necessary to stress that the views ofJustice Stevens were
not to be "interpreted as authoritative guidance for application of
our ruling to the facts of the case." 96
C. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a dissent
which lamented the extension of the Teny doctrine into the home.97
Justice Brennan criticized the majority for extending the Terry ra-
tionale to a "wide variety of more intrusive searches and seizures." '98
Justice Brennan feared that the narrow exception of the Terry rule
was swallowing up the general rule that searches were reasonable
89 Id. at 1100.
90 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
91 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
92 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
93 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 1101 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
95 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
97 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
872 [Vol. 81
1991] FOURTH AMENDMENT-PROTECTIVE SWEEPS
only if based on probable cause.99
Justice Brennan began his dissent by agreeing that officers exe-
cuting arrest warrants in private homes do have an interest in pro-
tecting themselves from third parties on the premises.100 However,
he argued that the majority offered no support for its assumption
that the dangers of ambush during planned home arrests ap-
proached the danger of the on-the-beat situation addressed in
Terry. 101
Justice Brennan stressed that physical entry into the home was
the chief evil against which the wording of the fourth amendment is
directed.10 2 He argued that the majority underestimated the intru-
sive nature of a protective sweep, and he feared that a protective
sweep would bring virtually all personal possessions in the home
not hidden from view within the police officer's purview.10 3 Justice
Brennan predicted that police officers searching for dangerous con-
federates of the arrestee might enter every room, open chests and
closets, and view a wide range of personal possessions. 04
Justice Brennan argued that although a protective sweep may
not constitute a "full blown" search, it was much closer to it than a
limited "pat-down" for weapons or a frisk of an automobile.' 05
While the majority reasoned that the "ingredient" of officer safety
warranted the reliance on Terry, Justice Brennan reasoned that the
Buie facts lacked the limited search "ingredient" present in Tery. 10 6
He found that the intrusion in Buie was more than minimal; there-
fore, the majority's holding deviated from Terry and its progeny. 10 7
Justice Brennan concluded that, in light of the special sanctity
of a private residence and the highly intrusive nature of a protective
sweep, police officers must have probable cause to fear that their per-
sonal safety is threatened by an arrestee's hidden confederate
before they may sweep through the entire house.'08
99 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 1102 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103 Id (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan feared that officers conducting a
protective sweep would also "view letters, documents and personal effects that are on
tables or desks or are visible inside open drawers; books, records, tapes, and pictures on
shelves; and dothing, medicines, toiletries and other paraphernalia not carefully stored
in dressing drawers or bathroom cupboards." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 1102-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 1103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).




The majority in Buie correctly balanced the safety concerns of
the officer against the intrusiveness of the search under the fourth
amendment. Prior to Buie, the Court implicitly had recognized the
possibility that officers may conduct a search incident to an
arrest. 10 9 Buie merely made explicit the right of officers to take ac-
tion to protect their safety. Justice White sensibly rejected the re-
spondent's argument that probable cause is required to justify a
protective sweep.' 10 A probable cause standard is unnecessary and
impracticable in light of the dangerous situations confronted by po-
lice officers during an in-home arrest. The majority also wisely re-
jected the petitioner's insistence that no level of suspicion is needed
to justify a protective sweep during an in-house arrest. 1I' Accept-
ance of this "no suspicion" standard would have been unquestiona-
bly a major defeat to the protections of the fourth amendment, and
would have given arresting officers carte blanche to conduct a protec-
tive search incident to any lawful arrest. The Court correctly chose
the middle ground of the Teny requirement of reasonable suspicion.
At first glance, the holding in Buie may appear, as Justice Bren-
nan argued, to be an unwarranted and dangerous extension of Terry,
leading to intrusions into the cherished sanctity of the home. How-
ever, the holding in Buie is generally consistent with both the
Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence and the holdings of Terry
and Chimel. 1 2 In addition, a closer examination of the holding indi-
cates that it is limited strictly to situations where officer safety is a
viable concern. This limitation should prevent some of the abuses
that courts have allowed in their varied applications of the protec-,
tive sweep doctrine.
Buie comports with the Court's recent fourth amendment juris-
prudence. Since the decision in Terry, the Court frequently has used
a balancing approach to authorize governmental intrusions based
on less than probable cause. The Court repeatedly has found the
government's interest in various objectives to outweigh the intru-
sion of a warrantless search for a variety of reasons less compelling
109 The Court in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), stated in dicta that while
the area that may be legally searched is broader under a search warrant than an arrest
warrant, the "difference may be more theoretical than real ... because the police may
need to check the entire premises for safety reasons." Id. at 589.
110 Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1096-97. For an explanation of Respondent's argument, see
Brief of Respondent, Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990) (No. 88-1369).
111 Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1098 n.2. For an explanation of Petitioner's argument see Brief
for Petitioner, Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990) (No. 88-1369).
112 See supra note 78 for a discussion of Chimel.
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than officer safety. 113 For example, in 1989, the Court held in Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab 114 that the government's
interest in preventing the promotion of drug users to sensitive posi-
tions outweighed the employee's expectation of privacy, and thus
permitted suspicionless drug testing of customs agents.1 15 The
Court certainly believes that the government's interest in protecting
the lives of police officers is greater than an interest in detecting
drug use in customs agents. 11 6
Moeeover, in situations very similar to a protective sweep, the
Court has held that both officer safety and the safety of others will
outweigh the need for a warrant and probable cause. 1 7 For exam-
ple, in Chimel,11 the officer was allowed to search the arrestee and
the area under the arrestee's immediate control for protective rea-
sons without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. In United
States v. Robinson,1" 9 the "Supreme Court converted the search inci-
dent doctrine into a per se rule permitting searches within the limit
set by Chimel."'120 The Court in Robinson held that a search incident
to a lawful arrest is permissible whether or not weapons or evidence
reasonably could be expected to be found. 12 1 Chimel and Robinson
demonstrate that concern for an officer's safety as he or she makes a
lawful arrest justifies a narrowly defined search of the person. 122 An
officer conducting a protective sweep for safety reasons has an
equally compelling safety interest.
113 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) "(govern-
ment's interest in the safety of the nation's railroads justifies drug testing of railroad
employees); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (government's interest in operat-
ing a probation system warrants a probation officer's search of probationer's home);
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (government's interest in
seizing smuggled contraband makes 16 hour detention of person at border reasonable);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (government's interest in in-
terdicting the flow of illegal aliens justifies the routine vehicle stop at border
checkpoint).
114 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
115 Id. at 1396, 1397.
116 The Court has recognized that officer safety is a compelling government interest.
See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692
(1981).
117 See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 (officer protection justified cursory check of car for
weapons during detention of driver); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)
(officer safety justified ordering driver of car to step out of vehicle onto shoulder of road
during stop for routine traffic violation); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48
(1972) (concern for officer safety justified removal of weapons from driver's waistband
based on informer's tip).
118 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
119 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
120 Joseph, supra note 6, at 100.
121 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
122 Joseph, supra note 6, at 101-02.
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The Buie Court also followed the analytical framework used in
Terry and Chimel when it examined the validity of a warrantless
search. The Terry Court insisted that the officer conducting an un-
warranted search must satisfy a dual inquiry.' 23 An officer's action
must be justified at its inception, and it must be related reasonably
in scope to the circumstances which justified the action in the first
place. 124 The Chimel Court applied the same approach in allowing
the officer's search of the arrestee for self-protective reasons, but it
struck down the full search of the premises.' 25 The Buie Court
adopted a similar approach. The Court required that an officer con-
ducting a protective sweep first must produce the specific facts
which led him or her to believe that there was a dangerous third
person present at the arrest scene, and then must limit his or her
search to the scope necessary to protect himself or herself from any
third persons who may be present.' 26
The demonstration of specific and articulable facts required by
Buie is an objective test that prevents reliance on the mere hunches
or "good faith" of the arresting officers. 127 This is the same objec-
tive case by case approach first articulated in Terry.' 28 This require-
ment should prevent lower courts from allowing protective sweeps
merely because of the presence of a third person; instead, it will
require officers to demonstrate why they believe that the third per-
son poses a threat to those on the arrest scene. 129
Even if the officer can articulate the specific facts which led him
or her to develop a reasonable suspicion of danger, the officer may
only inspect those places where a person may be found; the search
may not last longer than necessary to dispel the threat of danger,
and may never last longer than it takes to complete the arrest and
leave the premises.' 30 These requirements limit the scope of the
search in two important and sensible ways. First, the protective
sweep may only be a cursory inspection of places where a person
could be found, and is limited to what is necessary to protect the
safety of officers and others.' 3 ' Accordingly, Justice Brennan's con-
123 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
124 Id. at 20.
125 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
126 Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1099 (1990).
127 Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22).
128 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
129 Compare Gagliano v. State, 97 Nev. 297, 629 P.2d 781 (1981) (protective sweep
illegal since officer had no reason to believe anyone present but defendant and teenaged
daughter), with United States v. Irizarry, 673 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1982) (protective sweep
upheld when another person actually seen within building with gun).
130 Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1099.
13 Id.
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cern that officers will conduct full-blown searches of the premises
during a protective sweep is unfounded.' 3 2 This limitation should
prevent examination of documents and searches into drawers,
desks, cabinets, and other areas where a person could not be hid-
den.' 33 Second, the majority held that a protective sweep may last
no longer than is necessary to effectuate the arrest and depart the
premises.'8 4 This limitation should prevent officers from using the
rationale of a protective sweep as an excuse to linger at an arrest
scene for the purpose of conducting a warrantless search for evi-
dence. Obviously, the rationale of a "protective" search loses its
force if the officers can extend the search solely for investigative
purposes.
Thus, the Buie Court correctly balanced the intrusiveness of the
protective sweep against the government's interest in protecting its
law enforcement officers. Moreover, Buie is consistent with Terry
and Chimel and, if applied properly, will limit the scope and intru-
siveness of warrantless searches of the home.
VI. APPLICATION OF BUE
Many courts and commentators have agreed that less than
probable cause is required to justify a police "protective sweep."1 35
132 The Buie majority reasoned that their reliance on the cursory nature of the protec-
tive sweep was consistent with the Court's holding in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987). Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1099 n.3. Hicks held that an officer's moving of a turntable to
look at its serial number exceeded a "cursory inspection" and could only be justified by
probable cause. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328. Buie stressed that the officer in Hicks clearly was
searching for evidence and was not motivated by officer safety. Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1099
n.3. Although a protective sweep is also a "search," it is permissible on less than prob-
able cause because it is "limited to that which is necessary to protect the safety of officers
and others." Id.
133 The Buie decision, if misapplied, could have serious ramifications for the plain view
doctrine. The plain view doctrine allows police, under certain circumstances, to seize
evidence in plain view without a warrant if the initial intrusion that brought the police
within plain view of the evidence is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
Hicks, 480 U.S. at 134. The Buie decision does not allow officers conducting a protective
sweep to conduct the sort of search invalidated in Hicks. An officer's search must be
limited to that "which is necessary to protect the officer and others." Buie, 110 S. Ct. at
1099.
134 Id
135 Kelder, supra note 6, at 1022.
[Tihis article submits that the better approach is to adhere to the balance erected in
Terry. A standard of reasonable suspicion based on "specific and articulable facts" is
a rather low threshold showing of necessity for a search, and one which can appar-
ently be applied in the protective sweep area without undue risk to the safety of law
enforcement officers.
See atsoJoseph, supra note 6, at 120 ("[o]fficers would need reasonable suspicion both to
believe others were on the premises and that those persons are likely to be dangerous to
the officers").
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Professor Lafave has noted that
[i]t would make little sense to say that police may take protective meas-
ures against those known to be present, but that they may never stray
beyond the room of the arrest to see if there are others present who,
by virtue of their location, may be in an even more advantageous posi-
tion to offer forcible resistance on behalf of the arrestee.' 3 6
The difficult task is to articulate the set of facts and circumstances
needed to justify such protective action.' 3 7 Unfortunately, the ma-
jority in Buie failed to examine the types of factors that may be im-
portant for courts to weigh when determining the reasonableness of
an officer's actions. As evidenced by the conflicting concurrences in
Buie, it is unclear what factors the Maryland Court of Appeals should
consider on remand. As a result, lower courts may apply Buie too
broadly, thereby justifying unnecessary officer actions. Without the
proper guidance, law enforcement officers may be left with the
power to conduct warrantless searches of the home subject only to
the requirement that they retroactively justify the search with con-
cerns about their safety.
If the majority acknowledged that certain concerns justify an of-
ficer's warrantless searches, then the nature of these concerns
should be explored in some detail. Many lower courts examining
the protective sweep doctrine have suggested facts and circum-
stances that justify the self-protective actions of the officer. It is im-
perative to the preservation of fourth amendment rights that in
cases where an objective, reasonableness test is applied, courts jus-
tify and explain the circumstances under which an officer may con-
duct a warrantless search of the premises.
This Note suggests that the factors to be considered can be sep-
arated into the following categories: (1) the nature of the arrestee;
and (2) the nature of the premises. 138 It is important to remember
that these concerns often overlap and the exigent circumstances of
the arrest situation are not capable of clear delineation and categori-
zation. In addition, these factors must coalesce into a reasonable
suspicion that an individual posing a danger to the arresting officers
is present at the arrest site.
A. NATURE OF THE ARRESTEE
This inquiry should begin with an examination of the serious-
136 W. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 6.4(c), at 647.
137 Id.
138 These factors are derived from the examination of "protective sweep" cases con-
tained in both W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 6.4(c), at 648-51, and Kelder, supra note 6, at
1010-13.
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ness of the crime committed for which the arrest was made. This
consideration gives weight to the fact that the level of danger felt by
arresting officers may differ according to the criminal conduct in-
volved. For example, courts have recognized a greater level of dan-
ger associated with drug related offenses' 3 9 and murder cases. 140
This approach forces the officers to carefully weigh the nature of the
crime committed; as a result, it should protect individuals from un-
necessary government intrusion in cases that certainly do not war-
rant protective action.' 41
This category should also take account of whether the particu-
lar arrestee is known to work with confederates. Courts often have
considered this a legitimate source of concern for arresting of-
ficers. 142 Whether any accomplices of the arrestee are still at large
or have already been arrested is also a pertinent consideration. 143
The known existence of confederates, however, is not a substitute
for a reasonable suspicion that a confederate is present at the time
of the arrest. Although an officer's knowledge regarding a suspect's
use of confederates should be weighted, the holding in Buie de-
mands more than just knowledge that a suspect has a propensity for
using confederates; it requires individualized suspicion that a dan-
139 See, e.g., United States v.Jackson, 778 F.2d 933, 936-37 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 910 (1986) (protective sweep allowed based on general knowledge that drug
dealers are often armed); United States v. Marszalkowski, 669 F.2d 655 (11 th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982) (protective sweep upheld because "drug dealers are likely to
be armed and dangerous" and there was ongoing activity on premises); United States v.
Broomfield, 336 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (protective sweep upheld because of-
ficers knew defendant was involved in major drug traffic conspiracy, "a violence-prone
business").
140 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980) (pro-
tective sweep permissible incident to arrest of defendant who had just murdered a man
on the street).
141 See, e.g., State v. Seiss, 168 NJ. Super. 269, 402 A.2d 972 (1972) (protective sweep
not justified in arrest of defendant for nonpayment of traffic fines since officers "were
not thrust into a situation which created a risk to their safety").
142 See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 577 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850
(1978) (protective sweep upheld because of knowledge of confederate seen the day
before); United States v. Sellers, 520 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
1075 (1977) (protective sweep upheld when officers had information that arrestee was
traveling with armed associates); United States v. Looney, 481 F.2d 31 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1070 (1973) (sweep upheld because defendant had known propensity
for using confederates); Broomfield, 336 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (sweep upheld
when evidence showed that defendant was member of criminal conspiracy and was not
acting alone in the offense).
143 People v. Mack, 27 Cal. 3d 145, 611 P.2d 454, 165 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1980) (sweep
upheld when officer knew defendant had been arrested for armed robbery and that his
accomplice had escaped).
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gerous individual is present at the time of the arrest.1 44
B. NATURE OF THE PREMISES
This category accounts for the officer's perception of the actual
location of the arrest and any exigent circumstances surrounding
the arrest. The category's primary concern is evidence at the arrest
site that other people may be present on the premises.1 45 Minor
consideration may also be given to the time and place of the arrest.
A midnight raid in an area known for drug related violence may war-
rant more initial caution than a mid-day arrest in a more tranquil
setting. In addition, exigent circumstances of the arrest sometimes
make clear the officer's concern for safety. These concerns range
from actual shooting 46 at the premises to suspicious behavior by
the arrestee or suspicious noises.' 47
An examination of a protective sweep in light of the above fac-
tors will assist courts in determining the reasonableness of a search.
However, even if a court is satisfied that an officer possessed the
reasonable suspicion warranting a protective sweep, the sweep may
still be invalidated if it exceeded its permissible scope. As the dis-
sent aptly noted, Buie may be resolved quickly on remand. 48
An integral part of the Court's holding in Buie is the require-
ment that the sweep may last "no longer than is necessary to dispel
the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than
it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises."' 49
Although it is unclear from the record whether Buie was safely
outside the premises when Officer Frolich entered the basement,
the dissent noted that the Court of Appeals had concluded that "at
144 United State v. Gerry, 845 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1988) (sweep justified because car of
another suspect was parked in driveway and officer heard sound of voices within).
145 See United States v. Irizarry, 673 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1982) (another person actually
seen with gun); United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 918 (1982) (protective sweep upheld because discovery of a second person meant
defendant's statement that no one was within the premises was a lie); State v. Willis, 269
N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1978) (protective search upheld after arrest of rapist because taxi
driver who drove arrestee told police another person was present).
146 See, e.g., United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432 (11th Cir. 1988) (protective sweep
permissible after arrest for cocaine possession when officer initially called to premises
because of report of gunfire); State v. McCurry, 587 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. App. 1979) (pro-
tective sweep allowed after persons inside shot at officers); State v. Mackins, 47 N.C.
App. 168, 266 S.E.2d 694 (1980) (officers justified in entering and searching after two
shots had been fired from building, killing one person and wounding another).
147 United States v. Turbyfill, 373 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Mo. 1974), aft'd, 525 F.2d 57
(8th Cir. 1975) (alarming noises in basement placed officers in reasonable apprehension
of danger).
148 Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1102 n.4 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 1099.
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the time of the warrantless search, Buie was safely outside the
house, handcuffed and unarmed."150 This fact, however, is disputed
by the parties. If the state court concludes that the protective sweep
of the basement occurred after the police had adequate time to com-
plete the arrest and depart the house, then the court must invalidate
the search. Accordingly, an examination of the reasonableness of
the search would be unnecessary.
Assuming that Detective Frolich's search was not after the of-
ficers departed Buie's residence, an examination of the reasonable-
ness of the search in light of the factors mentioned above serves to
highlight the important issues that courts must consider when as-
sessing the legality of a protective sweep. An examination of the
"nature of the arrestee" begins by noting that Buie was being -ar-
rested for armed robbery, a dangerous crime involving a weapon.1 51
The officers were also aware that an arrest warrant had been issued
for Uoyd Allen, the accomplice of Buie.1 52 These factors logically
would tend to increase the potential of danger during the arrest.
An examination of the "nature of the premises" also supplies
facts which could reasonably lead an officer to suspect danger. The
phone call to Buie's residence revealed that at least one other per-
son, a female, was present.1 53 Detective Frolich was unsure how
many people lived in the house.1 54 In addition, upon entry into the
home, Buie did not immediately turn himself over to the police.
Buie suspiciously remained in the basement while Detective Frolich
called three times for Buie to reveal himself if present.' 55 This fact
could also lead an officer to assume that Buie had something, or
someone, to hide in the basement.
However, it is unclear from the record exactly why Detective
Frolich entered the basement. Detective Frolich did not articulate
any specific facts which led him to infer that a dangerous third per-
son was on the premises. Frolich did have reasonable suspicion, if
not probable cause, to believe that third persons were present on
the premises due to the women seen at the arrest site. However,
there was no evidence that these individuals posed any danger to
the arresting officers. Moreover, the police had Buie's home under
surveillance since the robbery and had not spotted Allen, Buie's ac-
150 Id. at 1102 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Buie v. Maryland, 314 Md. 151, 166,
550 A.2d 79, 86 (1988)).
151 Id- at 1095.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Buie v. Maryland, 72 Md. App. 562, 566-67, 531 A.2d 1290, 1292 (1987).
155 Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1095.
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complice, near the premises. 156
The Buie case demonstrates the possible confusion that can re-
sult from the application of the objective "reasonableness" test of
Teny under these circumstances. It appears that the officers con-
ducting the arrest of Buie had enough information to reasonably
infer that a third person may be present at the Buie home.157 How-
ever, Detective Frolich did not present these facts, nor did he argue
that he entered the basement looking for a dangerous third person
out of a concern for his safety. The test of Buie requires that an
officer produce the specific and articulable facts that led him or her
to reasonably infer that another dangerous person was also pres-
ent.158 The interest in preserving the protections of the fourth
amendment should prompt the court on remand to cast a wary eye
at ill-defined suspicions and hunches. The record suggests that
Detective Frolich failed this test.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Buie Court addressed an important and recurring issue by
examining the protective sweep doctrine. By balancing the legiti-
mate safety concerns of the officer against the intrusiveness of the
protective sweep, the Court attempted to define the circumstances
which warrant such a search. This decision is consistent with the
Court's current approach to warrantless searches and is a responsi-
ble extension of the Terry doctrine into a traditional area of cher-
ished fourth amendment protection.
If properly followed, the Court's holding should protect both
the safety of law enforcement officers and the privacy interests of
citizens in their homes. However, the Buie Court relied on the Teny
standard of "specific and articulable" facts without defining what
factors officers and courts should consider when assessing the rea-
sonableness of a protective sweep. Courts must carefully examine
the circumstances surrounding a protective sweep when determin-
ing whether an officer's warrantless search is justified as a protective
action.
MARK J. SIFFERLEN
156 Buie v. State, 314 Md. 151, 165, 550 A.2d 79, 86 (1988).
157 Reasonable inferences of danger could be drawn from the following: the nature of
the crime; the accomplice had not been arrested; no gun had been found; other people
were present at the house; and Buie's suspicious delay in emerging from the basement.
158 Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1100.
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